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This is not a conformist book. Its thesis is bold: that
political theorists and mainstream commentators have been
looking for democracy in all the wrong places. The New
Left’s call for a reinvigorated, participatory democracy
aligned “around contentious moral questions that animate
citizens rather than bureaucratic, technical, or economic
issues that tend to bewilder and subdue them” has been
answered. But participation’s harbingers stand not on the left
but on the Christian Right, in particular the pro-life movement
(Shields’ main focus). Politics was once criticized as an elite,
expert game that failed to involve ordinary citizens; the new
politics of moral issues has ended that. Conservative
evangelicals, once the least involved portion of the electorate,
are now among the most involved. They are also, Shields
claims, among the most deliberative—if we gloss deliberative
values as we should. Such values, Shields argues, should be
defined as “the norms of behavior that collectively make
public deliberation possible.” Shields finds that Christian
Right activists advocate, and inculcate in rank-and-file
members through advocacy, training, and discipline, four
such norms: “the practice of civility and respect,” “the
cultivation of real dialogue by listening and asking questions,”
“the rejection of appeals to theology,” and “the practice of
careful moral reasoning.”
The one alleged deliberative norm that the Christian
Right rejects—“openness to alternative points of view”—is
one that Shields believes we all should reject as inconsistent
with justice-based social movements. Christian leaders “do
not encourage activists to question their own convictions.”
But Shields thinks this is a good thing. “Strong moral
convictions,” not “moral skepticism,” give movements
courage and purpose: no one regrets the moral confidence
of abolitionists or freedom riders. Shields calls for
“deliberative partisans” (his coinage, and his emphasis)
who may use the Socratic method as a tool of persuasion
but reject the Socratic goal of ceaseless self-questioning.
Such partisans benefit society by putting forth their own views
with “devotion and intellectual seriousness,” confident that
the merit of any claim will bear on its success.
This book challenges political theorists to engage “the
empirical realities of political life,” especially the reality of
necessary tradeoffs. Skeptical and nonpartisan citizens will not
be easily mobilized to pursue civic goods; greater participation
will come at the cost of some “excesses.” Shields' book also
challenges students of social movements to broaden the criteria
used to assess such movements. What should count is not just
a movement’s “success,” and certainly not its substantive
ends—whosemoral goodness social scientists are in no position
to assess—but its ability to engage citizens and improve the
quality of public debate. Christopher Lasch’s epigram, based on
Hannah Arendt’s categories, could serve as Shields’ motto:
“Action is to behavior what forgiveness is to tolerance.”
Shields makes a remarkably strong case. Defending an
unpopular thesis requires methodological thoroughness and
sharp argument. Shields displays both. As to methods, those
employed here are both wide and deep, combining voting data
with analyses of movement literature and—crucially—partic-
ipant observation in a variety of pro-life groups that operate in
different settings. Added to Shields’ unusual, self-abnegating
approach to sociology—he studies moral groups more to
understand than to explain them, and rejects the ubiquitous
assumption that moral conflicts reflect “culture” or social
forces—this gives Shields the ability to see new phenomena
and avoid old assumptions. To take a prominent case: while
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Shields mostly avoids polemic, he singles out Kristen Luker’s
Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood for particular
criticism. Her flaws are both methodological (small and
narrow samples, exclusively of activists) and conceptual (an
unjustified reduction of moral principles to worries over
“motherhood”). Luker’s work has been widely praised,
often regarded as path-breaking. But it comes out of
Shields’ book badly, perhaps critically, wounded.
A few of Shields’ findings confirm (with good data) what
intelligent amateurs already knew, or thought they knew.
Media darlings like Jerry Falwell and Randall Terry, far from
being representative of the Christian Right, are indeed widely
despised as extreme, embarrassing, and theologically narrow;
pro-life advocates indeed use logical arguments and do not
merely parrot scripture or religious authority. (The latter
finding may, however, be news to some theorists of
deliberative democracy who don’t get out much. One fairly
famous representative of that school asserted in public and in
my hearing that our democracy was threatened by those prone
to end debate with “because the Pope said so.”)
But most of what the book reports is striking and far from
obvious. For instance, Shields finds that religious Right
activists have the same problem Left activists have of
overestimating their similarity to ordinary citizens—but the
Right, unlike the Left, knows this, and has responded by
training their activists to know what is “normal” and to
compensate for the fact that they aren’t. And Shields
demonstrates fairly conclusively that reputable Christian Right
groups make huge efforts to train advocates in civility, not just
for pragmatic reasons but because scripture demands humility
and charity. (This, I infer, is why Shields uses “Christian
Right” rather than “religious Right.” He believes the specifics
of Christianity matter, affecting distinctly how movements act,
and therefore stresses those specifics rather than eliding them).
Most fascinating, Shields argues that “Christian Right
elites...tend to agree with Gutmann and Thompson [leading
theorists of “deliberative democracy”]. Like other Christian
movements in American history, the Christian Right has
learned that religious arguments are unpersuasive to many of
their fellow citizens. Thus, Christian leaders tell their rank-
and-file activists to carefully avoid religious arguments in
public forms.... It is actually the secular pro-choice movement
that routinely frames abortion as a religious issue.” Christian
activists are taught to speak to non-Christians of “injustice,”
not “sin,” and to stress how the “civil liberties of the unborn”
transcend theological boundaries. In private, they speak of sin
more freely, but still try, sincerely, to love pro-choice sinners.
The book could be encapsulated in a prayer Shields witnesses
outside an abortion clinic: “We know that these escorts believe
that they are doing the right thing and are good people. But
please Lord soften their hearts so that they will turn away from
baby-killing.” Shields calls this “both conciliatory and
judgmental,” intending praise on both counts.
On the level of argument, Shields also adduces original
insights (rare birds), not all of them fully proven but almost all
intriguing. He claims that the value of personal authenticity and
personal empowerment prized by the New Left, but not the
activist Right,makes civil discourse impossible: civility requires,
as Richard Sennett argued, public masks. And he argues
effectively that many liberals and left-liberals have become
fair-weather advocates of participation. They were happy to
praise the antiwar and civil rights movements, but the success of
the moral Right provokes calls for end-of-ideology centrism and
the virtues of the non-activist “median voter” (who sounds,
Shields grins, like the “silent majority”)—not that the median
voter would support Roe v. Wade if she had any idea how few
abortion restrictions it allows. This book will be dismissed by
many liberals and all radicals, but that is a shame. It should
justly provoke in both serious anxieties, and new ones.
In spite of its quality and daring, Shields’ work is
vulnerable to many small criticisms and two more basic
objections. Take the smaller faults first. Regarding voting
behavior, not his specialty, Shields argues that conservative
evangelicals, alienated ticket-splitters in 1972, were ener-
gized and brought back to civic life by moral issues. He
ignores an obvious and much-studied alternative theory:
that these ticket-splitting conservative evangelicals were
Southern Democrats dissatisfied by national Democrats’
racial liberalism but later enlisted by the Republican party
through racial appeals. Shields’ assumption that contempo-
rary liberals—Shields prefers “the Left,” which is more
partisan—care deeply about New Left values, and would be
disturbed to find the other side embodying them, might be
questioned. In my experience, most liberals under fifty are
either ignorant of the New Left or embarrassed by it.
Finally, there is the matter of George Tiller. Shields argues
that the violent fringe of the pro-life movement is fading;
crimes against both persons and property are way down, and
no murders have occurred for some time. A few weeks after
the book came out, Dr. Tiller was murdered in church. The
murder is not Shields’ fault, and the statistical trends remain
what they are. But given the vicious and constant threats Tiller
faced, Shields might have been more scrupulous in his fact
checking. He attributes some shocking claims about Tiller’s
practice to “the website of Dr. Tiller,” when the web address
he cites is that of a site that is bitterly opposed to Tiller and that
highlights quotations from Tiller flagrantly out of context.
(The website is still up, apparently unchanged, as of this
writing, and archived by me if that changes).
The bigger criticisms concern bigger matters: reason and
liberty. Shields’ view of human reason is, put simply, narrow.
He repeatedly (though in passing, since his methodology
suggests he should steer clear) opposes arguments grounded
in the natural law tradition to “relativism,” “postmodernism,”
or “skepticism,” or cites postmodern works as the only
alternative to his own perspective, as if these exhausted the
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possibilities. We must choose between natural law or the
abyss. This is consistent with Shields’ view that the pro-life
movement should love its opponents but may legitimately
remain deaf to their arguments. These arguments, by
implication, may be expressive but cannot be rational.
Contrast this with Alasdair MacIntyre, himself a Thomist of
a reflective stamp, who in After Virtue used the abortion
debate as one example of an argument that was “intermina-
ble” because the various parties occupied incompatible moral
traditions. Thomist reasoning indeed suggests abortion’s
grave injustice because embryos are human beings who have
all adult capacities in immature form; Kantian reasoning
(which, one could add, denies the coherence of Thomist
categories like substance and ontology) uses a universalizing
argument to conclude that abortion may be wrong but no
more wrong than contraception; Lockean reasoning derives a
right to abortion from women’s inviolable rights over their
persons, including their bodies. MacIntyre, too, ends up
claiming our real choice is “Aristotle or Nietzsche”—but he
admits along the way that other forms of reason are reason,
and make perfect sense, within their own traditions.
Shields’ confidence that reason speaks in one voice is
particularly dangerous given the minority status of his
preferred conception of it. As I have previously argued, some
would say mocked (“Blastocyst Rights—What Science?”
Society 44, No. 4 [May/June 2007]: 38–42.), if one adopts
the perspective of Kant’s or Locke’s epistemology, or that of
modern science generally, it is Thomist talk of “ontology” and
“substance” that contains no reasons at all. (This dismissal
applies only to blastocysts. While late-term fetuses may or
may not count as human beings, no epistemology rules it out.)
Given that Shields refers to science and civil liberties as
common languages suitable for respectful debate, he surpris-
ingly fails to stick to such languages. Most likely, Shields sees
no difference between the language of natural law or ontology
and that of rights, civil liberties, and injustice: he believes the
former, like the latter, to be common ground that all rational
citizens must share. If so, he is mistaken, and in making this
mistake perhaps reveals that Sennett’s masks sometimes slip.
It is the Lockean tradition that is most neglected by this
book. Shields slights questions of rights and governmental
power consistently, in fact deliberately; he claims that rights
are a Left concern, while the Right prefers to focus on “moral
obligation.” One would hardly know from the book, with its
focus on loving efforts to change hearts and minds, that the
pro-life movement proposes a ban on abortion, enforced
through the criminal law. (The word “illegal” appears twice
in the book; one of those times, it precedes “immigrants.”)
For rights-based supporters of abortion rights, this fact is not
peripheral but central: women’s control over their bodies is
the main issue implicated not only by legal bans on abortion
but by moral demands that women defer to others who argue
from moral premises that they themselves reject.
Taking Lockeanism seriously—broadly understood;
Locke’s specific arguments are optional—would illuminate
some omissions in Shields’ argument. Shields assumes
throughout that the question of whether fetuses are human
settles the question of abortion. He mentions in passing
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s argument (think back to college;
she imagines one of us strapped to an ailing violinist for
nine months) that a personal right of movement or bodily
control might justify abandoning even human life. But he
lays aside the argument quickly, on the grounds that the
pro-choice movement has not adopted Thomson’s argument
(which, Shields claims, concedes that “the embryo is a
person”; I would say it only does so hypothetically). This is
true only if we take things very literally. While few
movement activists are likely to take as a manifesto an
intricate article from Philosophy and Public Affairs, slogans
such as “a woman has a right to control her body” or “who
decides: you or them?” are long-standing and successful
versions of the Thomson argument, which in turn resembles
a Lockean argument, in folk form. One will think these
slogans beside the point if one assumes at the outset that
rights are a distraction from the real issue, namely life. But
the slogans have been successful—they were tested first—
because many Americans regard them as central, not
distracting. Their appeal extends beyond those who endorse
appeals to self-ownership as such. Anyone who defends
abortion as a matter of personal right—“privacy” being the
right word for the moral value here, whether or not it names
something in the Constitution—is likely to think that the
boundaries of personal decision must be addressed before,
not after, moral duties are asserted at the point of shield and
gun. Any rights-based perspective must therefore question
Shields’ determination to separate good political practices
from the ends their practitioners hope, coercively, to further.
These are, admittedly, engaged as well as scholarly
criticisms. Only innovative and meaty work, the kind that
might change minds, calls for such criticisms. Among other
virtues, The Democratic Virtues of the Christian Right is
both careful and clear enough to interest scholars and
provocative and relevant enough to engage students with
little background. This is both a courageous work and, in
many ways, a classic. It deserves to start a great many
arguments, and there is little doubt that it will.
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